In this episode of Intelligence matters, host Michael Morell talks with CSIS senior member Chris Johnson about the Chinese outlook on the Russia-Ukraine war. Morell and Johnson talk about how the crisis in Ukraine affects China’s view of Taiwan and how China would like the conflict to end. Johnson says that in Ukraine, chemical weapons “would probably be a dividing line for the Chinese, even if it wasn’t in Syria.”
HIGHLIGHTS:
- How the war between Russia and Ukraine is affecting China’s view of Taiwan: “The Chinese were never going to see the situation in Ukraine as an opportunity, while the US and the West are distracted, to invade Taiwan … My sense is the only way it has really affected China’s vision, “It’s important that Taiwan has its own cadence. It’s on its own timeline within the Chinese brain. And I don’t think that’s affected at all by developments on the ground in Ukraine.”
- China’s perspective on how the war should end: “In terms of how they would like it to end. I think they would like Putin to show a little more power to be seriously willing to negotiate … I think they would ultimately love to see Russia withdraw and some “I’m trying to neutralize this part of Ukraine by negotiating. I think it’s probably quite fanciful in terms of things.”
- The potential use of chemical weapons by Russia: “It seems that we are at a time when Putin is certainly still trying to build up the strength he would need to really go to Kyiv and other big cities with a lot, a lot of strength. If he is in the process of doing so, he will not go Well, they still have the logistical problems and other things that we’ve been seeing that make them less effective militarily and they had to consider the use of chemical weapons. , although not in Syria “.
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“Intelligence Matters” – Transcript by Chris Johnson
Producer: Paulina Smolinski
MICHAEL MORELL: Chris, welcome back. You and Sue Mi Terry compete for the most frequent guest on Intelligence Matters.
CHRIS JOHNSON: I wanted to count this morning to see if I was in the lead, but I couldn’t.
MICHAEL MORELL: Chris, we are going through a very difficult time in Ukraine. The intimidation of the Russian military buildup, the invasion itself, which we are still going through, the use of some of the most brutal attacks by the Russian army. And now you and I will look at all of this from the perspective of China, which I think is incredibly important. And perhaps the place to start, Chris, is to start with the broad relationship between Russia and China before Ukraine took place. You know, how would you have described it at that time? And what was it based on?
CHRIS JOHNSON: I think I would have described it as an association of mutual interest and an association of mutual grievances. And keep in mind that I didn’t say it was a marriage of convenience, which I think is too much to underestimate what has happened in the relationship, certainly over the last decade, maybe even a little more than that. But most importantly, I think in the current context of what we are seeing with Russia and Ukraine, I also did not describe it as a new axis, as the Trump administration no doubt implied in its national security strategy in 2017 by describing the Chinese. and the Russians as a bit on the same level as our new strategic competitors. And it is interesting, and perhaps worrying, that it is now explicitly set up by some of the Biden administration. Or at least they seem to be trying to convince us that it is a new axis, maybe all the powers of the old axis.
As for how I would have described it, the mutual interest side of the relationship is very clear. You know, China needs oil, gas, wheat, other commodities, and in many ways, military technology, and Russia has it all. And I think that, as what is currently happening in the situation in Ukraine stands out, Russia needed and needs stability on its eastern border in order to be able to focus on supporting its Western proximity abroad. Or at least that’s how they see it. And then obviously, especially in the current context, they need Chinese cash.
As for the set of mutual grievances, I have the feeling that both certainly share a contempt for the US-led international order, and do not think that the US and its allies should be able to dictate the system of government that countries can choose. themselves. And they certainly don’t like the US abusing, as they say, its dominance of the global financial system – as the Chinese refer to as long-arm jurisdiction – to punish systems of government they don’t like. As for what is most based, in my opinion, obviously on the big elephant in the room, and there is no denying the importance of the personal relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. And in my opinion, this is really about three things. The first is, well, the bottom line is that when each of them looks at the other, they basically see themselves. And I think this is a very important piece of the puzzle.
MICHAEL MORELL: And if you like it, someone like you will like it.
CHRIS JOHNSON: Exactly. We all like people like us, don’t we? But do you know what they see when they look at each other? The first thing I think they see, I think, is someone strong and big and responsible within their system, just like them. The second is that I think both of them, in different ways, of course, but they both have that kind of messianic quality or a perception of themselves as a man of history, a man of destiny to achieve great things for them. and for your country. . And I think the most important thing is that they both share the desire and commitment to go to the mattresses, if necessary, to protect these systems.
And then just one last word on the relationship between Russia and China as it existed before this crisis. I’ve noticed that I think a lot of things are also generational, because otherwise you can explain all the different analytical takes and so on what that relationship is like. I think for senior analysts who were directly involved in the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s or where they were heavily influenced by it. They tend to emphasize challenges, mistrust, historical and relationship grievances. And I think much younger analysts tend to see it almost the opposite that this is really a new axis. And I think people in my cohort might see it as a place in the middle more like what I described as this association of mutual interest and mutual grievance.
MICHAEL MORELL: Do you think the Chinese knew Putin’s plans in advance? Do you think Putin told Xi what he was going to do?
CHRIS JOHNSON: I don’t think he told you what he was going to do. You know, there has obviously been a lot of speculation that could have happened at the opening ceremonies. You know, they had a meeting on the sidelines and they released that statement that we’re all looking at now to see what it might mean. So I don’t think he told her that explicitly in part because I just don’t think this is their relationship. And perhaps equally, if not more interesting, before that meeting there was a lot of speculation that Xi Jinping could tell Putin not to do so. And my sense is that not only Xi Jinping, but I think most Chinese would see it almost rude. What I think he probably told Putin, though, was that if you do, make sure you have something that comes close to an acceptable justification. And of course, in there, you know all the facts, propaganda which is a pretty broad definition. But something if you want some support from me that can hold me. And I think we can debate, you know, whether what happened would fit into that category or not.
MICHAEL MORELL: And while the Chinese were watching the military build-up, they were probably getting information from Russia. How do you think they thought this would go before it started?
CHRIS JOHNSON: I think there’s been a lot of controversy about that, too. And the overview, no doubt in the media, etc., is that they were surprised. They thought it was just building as part of a lighthouse. That’s not my point. I have a feeling that, at the highest levels of leadership and including President Xi, there was a sense that I would go into it. And I think not only would I go in, but I would go in. they remain to the east. So focus on the eastern parts of Ukraine, certainly do not sweep with five different points of attack, you know, as we have seen. And I think their assessment, as you said, based on the information they would have been receiving from the Russians about the Ukrainian army, they thought it would be quick and quick because of Russian military superiority.
MICHAEL MORELL: Do you also think they were surprised by the Western response?
CHRIS JOHNSON: Definitely. Yes. No questions asked. My view is that in the grand scheme of things, the Chinese didn’t really focus much and probably still aren’t on what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine. You know, from the point of view of China’s interests, they obviously have to pay attention to what’s going on to position themselves tactically. But my opinion is that they had two main areas of focus, both of which were what we might call second- and third-order effects. What would be the first, the US would really support the rhetorical blow that was happening in the pre-invasion period over very strong financial sanctions, technological restrictions, things like that. And the second was, if the U.S. could consider those unreliable Europeans on its side as part of a multilateral coalition given the scale of the European security threat, which is obviously significant. They may not like the answers to any of these questions or comments, at least how many days we are in this conflict.
MICHAEL MORELL: A US that did not respond with harsh sanctions and a West that did not unite would have served Chinese interests, right?
CHRIS JOHNSON: Yeah, or surely he could have given them, he sent them the wrong signals about things they might be considering. I’m sure we’ll talk about Taiwan and some point here.
MICHAEL MORELL: Since the invasion, we’re a couple of weeks ago, how do you think the Chinese are evaluating what’s going on, if they’re interested? Has your vision evolved in any way? Where do you think they are today thinking what is going on?
CHRIS JOHNSON: My view is that their vision has not changed, or at least the way they are pursuing that vision has not changed. So there has been a lot of speculation in the media outlets and elsewhere. There is always a phone call between President Xi and we had one with the Chancellor of Germany and the President of France. His foreign minister has done the same with his counterparts in these countries. In these discussions, they often say things: “Well, we would like peace and dialogue to be the solution here and for this to be in everyone’s interest.” And so on and so forth. And this is often interpreted as the Chinese pivot, it seems to be a word that is used far away, from Russia or thinking well about his hug in Russia, and so on. I don’t read it that way. For me, these are the basics of what the Chinese are communicating. And if you read the media every day, which I do, you can see that the US is still to blame for the crisis.
Earlier this week, there was only one very shocking and fascinating article in some way, about the United States as the Empire of Lies, for example, which also comes straight from Russian propaganda. So it doesn’t make sense that they are …
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