Published March 20, 2022 15:51 by
The Strategist
[By Nick Danby]
When more than 50 million Filipinos cast their ballots for a new president on May 9, they will decide far more than who will be the next owner of Malacañan Palace. At stake are the country’s foreign policies and their impact on US-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, Washington could close its “credibility gap” with Manila and strengthen regional security vis-à-vis Chinese maritime fighters.
Hyperbole abounds when you chew on national security. But these election consequences are nothing short of rational. Since the turn of the century, Philippine presidents have sought to balance Beijing and Washington – its powerful neighbors and longtime allies, respectively. But this balance, which a delicate geopolitical tension body should follow, is as subtle as a seesaw.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010) confirmed the American alliance, but mainly sought Chinese trade and investment agreements. Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) decided to confront China while consolidating the US-Philippine security alliance. Aquino fought for the country’s 2016 legal victory, which invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. He also strengthened security alliances with Asian neighbors and drafted a 15-year military modernization plan that would build a “minimum credible deterrent” against Chinese militarism.
The balance was shifted again when Rodrigo Duterte took over the presidency in 2016. Duterte mocked the United States for its imperial past. He has long regarded American security guarantees as worthless after China seized Mischief Reef in 1995 and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 from the Philippines, and Washington has never called for its defense.
Four months into his tenure, Duterte kissed goodbye to Washington and embraced Beijing. He decided that the militarily weak Philippines should appease a rising China, not oppose it. Recent memories in Manila of South China Sea disputes or Chinese bullying have been faint, almost non-existent.
For most of his administration, Duterte matched his sinophil words with his deeds. He has pledged $ 15 billion in Chinese investment pledges. In Beijing’s delight, he annulled key security initiatives with the United States, including the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (which allows US military-positioned equipment and troop rotations) and the 1999 Visitors’ Agreement (which allows US forces to operate effortlessly in the Philippines). . during a crisis). Duterte hoped to reward Beijing’s “goodwill” by endorsing Philippine economic development and recalling its aggressive South China Sea claims. Wupp.
Five years later, Duterte’s great appropriation left much to be desired. Only about 20 percent of the $ 15 billion in Chinese infrastructure promises ever made to the Philippines. China delivered as many soft loans and scholarships to the Philippines in 2019 as the US. Duterte also won little on the high seas.
In the last three years, China has been fighting against Philippine ships and making bold claims in the South China Sea. Chinese Coast Guard or maritime militia ships have rammed and sunk Filipino fishing boats, prevented military upgrades to Philippine claimed feature, disputed reefs swarmed with hundreds of fishing vessels, and water-cannon recovery vessels forcing controversial features to intimidate Manila. Control over parts of this critical waterway in China.
The pressure seems tireless without any sign of reduction. Just recently, on March 14, the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the Chinese Ambassador regarding the “illegal intervention” of a Chinese navy Dongdiao-Class electronic reconnaissance ship in the Philippine waters after spending three days in the Sulu Sea.
Duterte now recognizes that China is no longer the friend he once believed in or dreamed of. After covering the costs of military aggression but not mentioning any of the economic rewards, Duterte gave an overview. In April last year, he promised to send “gray ships for a claim” over oil and minerals in the South China Sea. By August, he had returned 18 months of threats to cancel the Visitors’ Agreement and began repairing his fragile relationship with Washington. Filipino dies of American accompaniment was poured.
Duterte is not alone in his newfound opinions. Most of the Philippine military and diplomatic establishment have maintained ties with Washington despite the leader’s pro-China bow. Now, however, these officials and Duterte recognize that “the freedom of the Filipino people depends on the balance of power in the South China Sea,” as Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin stated. People agree. A June 2019 survey found that 93 percent of Filipinos wanted to regain control of China-occupied islands in the South China Sea.
This year’s presidential contestants are adjusting to the foreign policy pendulum between Washington and Beijing – and in favor of the recent consensus for America. Frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr. calls for a Philippine military presence in the South China Sea to defend his economic rights, although he also wants a “bilateral consensus” with Beijing. More hawkishly, incumbent Vice President Leni Robredo promises a multilateral coalition to combat Chinese maritime coercion.
Even if the opinions of the candidates vary, their administrations will mix all possible economic cooperation and military confrontation against Beijing. At the same time, Manila will strengthen and strengthen its alliance with Washington and other regional partners to ensure that the South China Sea does not turn into a “Chinese lake”.
That’s good for the United States – and its quad partners. Duterte’s maintenance of bilateral security treaties and a new administration will strengthen the Indo-Pacific Alliance network through enhanced training, exercises and access to Filipino bases. This will allow American forces to end Chinese aggression persistently and respond quickly in emergencies.
But expected benefits bring more work.
For starters, Washington should revise the Visitors’ Agreement or the Mutual Defense Agreement to determine that an attack on the Philippine forces in the South China Sea would trigger an American response. (So far, Washington has promised such a response at the teaching point, but never codified it at the negotiating table.) Both countries should also update their naval rules of engagement to reflect the advent of Chinese paramilitary and gray-zone forces. Bilateral security exercises must also address and address the hybrid threat posed by Chinese ships.
Finally, the US should help accelerate the Philippines’ military modernization efforts to achieve “minimum credible deterrence” against China. The resort is predictable but practical: more corvettes, patrol boats, fourth generation fighter jets and small submarines.
Whoever becomes the next president of the Philippines must develop a strong foreign policy that balances two increasingly antagonistic powers. Washington can avoid tipping the scales against itself by no longer taking Manila for granted. It must clarify its commitments and provide the Philippines with the leadership and skills to fulfill those commitments. After all, that’s what allies are for.
Nick Danby is an intelligence officer in the US Navy Forward-deployed in Japan. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Navy, the US Department of Defense or the US Government.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
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